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Articles
FOR THE RESPONDENT
Byron L. Warnken, Professor of Law,
University of Baltimore School of Law
In Mary/and v. Wilson,l the Supreme Court of
the United States held, by a vote of 7 to 2, that the
Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures permits law enforcement officers, under a
"bright-line" rule, to remove all passengers from all
validly stopped vehicles. This article addresses my
involvement, and that of many others within the
University of Baltimore School of Law community,
in the Wilson case at the Supreme Court level.
On December 11, 1996, I argued Respondent
Wilson's case before the Supreme Court. For thirty
glorious minutes, I was afforded the opportunity that
most attorneys only dream about: to engage in
vigorous dialogue with the justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States. In retrospect, at least
three ingredients came together to allow me to be
the one who stood before the Supreme Court: (1)
academic credentials in Fourth Amendment search
and seizure, (2) academic and practical credentials
in appellate advocacy, and (3) luck.

Wilson in the Maryland Court System
On August 3D, 1995, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland filed a publish.ed opinion in
Mary/and v. Wi/son,2 authored for an unanimous
court by the Honorable Charles E. Moylan, Jr. I
immediately made note of the opinion for three
reasons. First, Judge Moylan and Professor Wayne
LaFave of the University of Illinois are considered
the two leading experts in the nation on Fourth
Amendment search and seizure. Second, the
opinion may be the best teaching tool I've ever
seen for explaining the difference between
holding/rationale and mere dicta. Third, the opinion
clearly articulated the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence leading up to, and applicable in, the
instant case.
The State of Maryland, as the non-prevailing
party, then filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. After the court of

appeals denied certiorari,3 the State then filed a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court
of the United States. Twenty-seven other states
joined in an amicus petition filed in support of
Maryland. Subsequently, the Court "conferenced"
the case and requested a Brief in Opposition to be
filed no later than May 3, 1996.
Shortly thereafter, I learned that defendant
Jerry Lee Wilson had not been represented by
counsel since the court of special appeals level,
meaning that he did not have an attorney in either
the Court of Appeals of Maryland or the Supreme
Court of the United States. On April 11, I confirmed
this with his prior counsel, who encouraged me to
become involved in the appeal. At that point, I tried
unsuccessfully to make contact with Mr. Wilson and
to offer my services on a pro bono basis. Mr.
Wilson was not in Maryland and I was unable to
make contact at that time.

Wilson in the Supreme Court
On April 12, I called the Supreme Court and
explained the situation to Francis J. Lorson,
Esquire, Chief Deputy Clerk. It was apparent that
the Court wanted to appoint counsel for Mr. Wilson.
My dilemma was that I was willing to represent Mr.
Wilson, but I had not yet been able to obtain Mr.
Wilson's authorization. This situation seemed to
present no problem for the Court, which authorized
me to commence work on the Brief in Opposition,
with the assurance that I would be appointed
"counsel of record."4
I had been involved in cases before the
Supreme Court in the past, but never as counsel of
record. In 1990, in Mary/and v. Craig,S I had served
as lead counsel on the Respondent's Brief. At that
time, I became a member of the Supreme Court
Bar, .and I had the privilege of sitting at counsel
table during the oral argument. As part of my
service component on the law faculty, I serve as the
Legal Program Director of the National Law

3340 Md. 502, 667 A.2d 342 (1995).
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Enforcement Officers' Rights Center. 6 In that
capacity, in 1995, I assisted on the amicus brief,
filed on behalf of the Petitioners, by the National
Association of Police Organizations, in Koon &
Powell v. United States,7 which is better known as
the Rodney King case.
I expressed to the Chief Deputy Clerk of the
Supreme Court my grave concern that I would not
be able to properly prepare the Brief in Opposition
in only twenty-one days. I assumed that I had
some leverage because, by offering to provide
representation for Mr. Wilson, I was, in a real
sense, doing the Court a favor. I was told that I
could "probably" obtain a ten-day extension, until
May 13, which would give me a total of thirty-one
days.
On April 15, I obtained a copy of the
petitions filed by the State and the amicus. I wrote
a letter to the Supreme Court, begging for an
additional two weeks or, in the alternative, at least
one week. The Court ultimately granted a total
extension of seventeen days, meaning that I had
five weeks from the date I received the petitions
until the date I had to file the Brief in Opposition.
The Supreme Court receives more than 6,000
certiorari petitions annually, yet it heard oral
argument in only eighty-five cases last year. Thus,
nearly 99% of the petitions for a writ of certiorari are
summarily disposed of with a one line order saying
"cert. denied." Nonetheless, based on the Court's
having "conferenced"the petitions in Wilson, plus
the Court's request for a written Brief in Opposition,
I believed that the Court had already decided to
grant certiorari or, at a minimum, was leaning
strongly in that direction, even before I contacted
the Court.
The Brief in Opposition
I had thirty-five days to accomplish what I
have always described to my students as an
attorney's most difficult task. An attorney is on the
prevailing side of a case, before either a federal
circuit court or a state court of last resort, and then
the losing side petitions the Supreme Court to take
the case. The zealous advocate wants to -- and

The National Law Enforcement Officers' Rights Center is the
advocacy and education branch of the Police Research and Education
Project (PREP), which is a component of the National Association of
Police Organizations, Inc., representing approximately 200,000 law
enforcement officers nationally.
6

must -- take every legal and ethical step to ensure
that the Supreme Court does not take the case. At
the same time, the human being in any attorney
would certainly relish the once-in-a-lifetime
opportunity to argue before the nine justices of the
highest court in the land. I was determined that if
certiorari were granted, I could look in the mirror
every morning knowing that I had left no stone
unturned in my effort to have certiorari denied.
The issue presented to the Court by the State
was as follows: "When a police officer makes a
lawful traffic stop, does the officer's automatic right
to order the driver to exit the vehicle, pursuant to
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977),
extend to passengers in the stopped vehicle?" My
task was to convince the Supreme Court that this
question was not important enough to need an
answer. Thus, the Brief in Opposition to the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is not a brief on the
merits of the case. The key to precluding certiorari
from being granted is not to convince the Supreme
Court that your side is the winning side, but to
convince the Supreme Court that American
jurisprudence does not need the Supreme Court to
answer the question presented to it. My strategy
and approach were five-fold.
First, I planned to demonstrate that the
analysis set forth by Judge Moylan was absolutely
correct. Second, it was my strong surmise that,
during the nearly two decades since the Court's
decision in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, only
infrequently had appellate courts even been
presented with the issue of the applicability of
Mimms to passengers. If I could demonstrate that
only rarely did any court need to know the answer
to the question posed by the State, perhaps I could
convince the Court that this was not a "cert. worthy"
issue. Third, it was my hope to demonstrate that
there was no significant split among those
jurisdictions that had addressed this issue. Fourth,
it was my hope that there was only minimal
evidence that harm to law enforcement officers
during traffic stops was inflicted at the hands of
passengers, as opposed to drivers. Fifth, because
the State was urging the Court to adopt a "brightline" rule, it was my hope to persuade the Court that
such a rule was inapplicable when considering the
vast array of passenger situations. Of course, at

7518 U.S. 81 (1996).
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that point, I did not know with certainty where the
research would take me.
The legal research on the second of the five
points mentioned above would require examining
every case addressing a Fourth Amendment issue,
in the context of an automobile, during a twodecade period. I assumed that almost all of those
intrusions would be controlled by existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, e.g: (1) a valid warrant
or warrantless arrest of one or more of the
occupants of a vehicle, followed by a valid search of
the interior of the vehicle, pursuant to the search
incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant
requirement; (2) a valid vehicle search, pursuant to
a valid search warrant or a valid automobile
exception to the warrant requirement; a valid
vehicle stop, followed by a valid vehicle search,
based on reasonable suspicion that one or more of
the occupants was presently armed and dangerous;
or (3) a valid consent search. Every one of these
situations, as well as others, would permit law
enforcement officers to remove the passengers
from the vehicle, yet would not require application
Thus, the issue
of Pennsylvania v. Mimms.
presented in Wilson would only present itself in
those situations in which (1) a vehicle was validly
stopped for a traffic violation, (2) there was no
evidence of administrative or criminal wrongdoing
on the part of the passenger, and (3) there was
nothing that posed a threat to officer safety, yet (4)
the officer required the passenger to exit the
vehicle.
University of Baltimore Law Student
Volunteers
If each federal and state jurisdiction had only
one reported post-Mimms vehicle case per month,
there would be close to 23,000 opinions to review.
At two cases per month, there would be more than
45,000 opinions. At four cases per month, the
number of opinions would exceed 90,000. Just the
first step -- locating and reviewing these opinions -would be an impossible task for one person, who
would then also have the ultimate assignment of
preparing and filing a timely Brief in Opposition.
At that time, it was two weeks before the start
of the spring semester law school final exams. My
timing could not be worse. Nonetheless, I posted a
sign at the Law School, seeking research
assistance and promising, in return, an interesting

28.1. U. Bait. L. F. 6

experience, a one-line resume entry, and a ticket to
the oral argument if I could obtain one. I assumed
that, with law school exams just two weekends
away, I would be lucky to get five or six student
volunteers and, as such, there should be no trouble
obtaining that many seats for the oral argument.
What a wonderful surprise for me when fifty-seven
law students came forward to volunteer. It was so
impressive that The Daily Record, Maryland's legal
newspaper, ran a feature story on it. 8 When
counting the states, the federal circuits, and the
federal districts, a total of 157 jurisdictions had to be
examined. Accordingly, with fifty-seven volunteers,
each student was assigned three jurisdictions.
The Team for the Brief in Opposjtion
While the law students went to work,
assembled the team of those individuals who would
assist me in the actual crafting of the Brief in
Opposition. This team consisted of Joe Freeman
Shankle, Esquire, Deborah N. Abramson, Esquire,
and Stacy W. McCormack, then a law clerk at my
wife's firm. Joe, a 1994 University of Baltimore
School of Law graduate, and Stacy, a 1996
graduate, were both former students of mine. Joe
ultimately invested in excess of 300 hours on the
Wilson appeal.
The fifty-seven volunteers had one week and
two weekends to complete the legal research.
Each volunteer was required to produce a work
product, consisting of one or more three-inch 3-ring
"0" binders, for the three assigned jurisdictions,
containing every opinion published during the
applicable 19-year period, if there was any
argument that the case could possibly be a Mimms
application to a passenger. The student work
product was due by April 29 -- seven days before
the start of final exams. After April 29, the student
volunteers would return to their exam preparation,
hoping not to have irretrievably harmed their
semester with a ten-day side trip to the Supreme
Court.
While
the
student
volunteers
were
researching, Joe, Stacy, and I began analyzing the
petitions filed by the State and the amicus. Joe and
Stacy pulled all of the authority relied on in these
petitions. I continued to plan the strategy for our

8
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three issues.
Joe began constructing the
Statement of the Case. He also conducted legal
research into the applicable secondary authority. In
addition, Joe began obtaining and analyzing
government data regarding assaults on law
enforcement officers during the last twenty years.
Stacy likewise researched secondary authority. In
addition, she researched all of the cases in which
the Court had adopted, or had rejected, a "brightline" approach in its Fourth Amendment analysis.
By April 29, the student volunteers had
submitted dozens and dozens of binders of case
authority. The task of analyzing and synthesizing
this authority, and converting it into a cohesive,
persuasive Brief in Opposition in only twenty-one
days seemed nearly impossible. We constructed
the first argument under the following point heading:
"The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland is not contrary to Supreme Court
precedent."
The point heading for the second argument
was as follows: "The issue presented in the petition
has remained largely untouched by the lower
courts." The final analysis of the case authority on
this issue supported my supposition. There were
only sixty-one occasions, in nineteen years -- or
roughly three times per year throughout the entire
nation -- in which a published opinion had
addressed the issue of whether the rule in Mimms
was intended to apply to passengers. The District
of Columbia and twenty-seven of the states had not
had even one occasion to address this issue.
Moreover, only four of the twelve federal circuits
and only four of the ninety-five federal districts had
confronted this issue even once. The small number
of jurisdictions confronting the issue is probably
because law enforcement officers, based on their
training, ordinarily keep all passengers in the
vehicle. When a validly stopped vehicle contains
two or more individuals, usually the last thing that
the law enforcement officer wants is to have them
outside the vehicle.
Not only was there minimal need for a "Mimms
to passenger" rule, there was only a minor split
among those states that had addressed the issue.
In Wilson, Maryland had become only the third state
to expressly hold, on non-independent and
adequate state grounds, that Mimms does not
apply to passengers.

The information provided by the Department of
Justice, in its annual Uniform Crime Reports, was
also revealing. During an eight-year period, there
were only four law enforcement officers killed by
passengers, during routine traffic stops, in the
entire nation. There were an additional seven
situations in which the assailant was unknown, as
well as four situations in which the assailant was a
combination of the driver and the passenger.
On the bright-line issue, the point heading
stated: "This issue is not an appropriate issue for
this Court to adopt a bright-line rule." An analysis
of the primary and secondary authority on this issue
appeared to place us in a strong posture on this
issue.
On May 20, following a handful of "allnighters," we filed the Brief in Opposition to the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. In our judgment, we
had accomplished everything that could possibly be
accomplished.
Our Brief in Opposition was
accompanied by our Motion for Leave to Proceed in
Forma Pauperis with Affidavit of Indigency by
Respondent's Father. Obtaining in forma pauperis
status was crucial because, without it, even if I were
willing to provide pro bono legal services, I would
still have to absorb hundreds of dollars in printing
costs.
The Grant of Certiorari
On June 17, the Supreme Court granted the
State's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. 9 Even
though we were the non-moving party on appeal,
we began work on the Respondent's Brief
immediately. In light of the State's Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, we did not need the Petitioner's
Brief to know exactly what the State would be
arguing. Joe, Deborah, Stacy, and I met to plan our
strategy for the Respondent's Brief.
We knew that our posture in the Respondent's
Brief would have to be different than our posture
had been in the Brief in Opposition. In the Brief in
Opposition, our goal had been to persuade the
Court why, with only eighty-five cases argued that
year, the Court should not allocate its time and
effort to an issue with minimal need for resolution.
Through its grant of the State's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, the Court had already decided that issue
against us. Now our task would be to convince the
9116

s. ct. 2521

(1996).
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Court why our side of the merits of the argument
was the correct side.
We knew that this task was formidable. First,
the current Supreme Court grants certiorari much
more to reverse than it does to affirm, particularly
when it grants certiorari to the government in
constitutional criminal procedure issues. Second,
this Court is quite conservative, i.e., progovernment, on Bill of Rights issues in criminal
cases. Third, among Fourth Amendment intrusions,
Wilson probably represented as de minimis an
intrusion as any that had come before the Court.
Fourth, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court's
closest precedent, a much more liberal Court had
previously ruled 6-3 in favor of the government.
The Petitioner's Brief
The State filed the Petitioner's Brief on August
1, 1996. It was an excellent brief that made three
arguments. First, the State argued that the Court,
in Mimms, had already extended to law
enforcement officers the authority to require all
passengers to exit all validly stopped vehicles.
Second, even if the Court had not previously
included passengers within its holding in Mimms, it
should now do so for exactly the same reason that
it ruled as to drivers, and the government's weighty
interest in officer safety should be balanced against
a de minimis Fourth Amendment intrusion. Third,
the Court should announce a bright-line rule in favor
of the government. Under a bright-line rule, there
is no need for a constitutional analysis on a caseby-case basis because the Court has pre-approved
a "bright line," meaning that the result will be the
same for all cases coming within the "line." In
addition to the State's brief, five amicus briefs were
filed in support of the State's position. These
amicus briefs were filed by the United States of
America, 39 states (filing together in one brief), the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, the National
Association of Police Organizations, Inc., and
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.
(which was joined by the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, Inc., the National District
Attorneys Association, Inc., the National Sheriffs'
Association, and the Police Law Institute).
The Respondent's Brief
Our Brief naturally countered each of the
State's arguments. The Supreme Court is always
concerned with the precedential effect of both its

28.1 U. BaIt. L. F. 8

holding and its rationale on the myriad of situations
that may subsequently arise. Around the same
time that the court of special appeals handed down
Wilson, the Court of Appeals of Maryland handed
down a 7-0 decision, in favor of the defendant, in
State v. Dennis. 10 Wilson was the "make 'em get
out of the car" case, and Dennis was the "make 'em
stay in the car" case. Because the State had also
filed a petition seeking certiorari in Dennis, we
intended to urge the Court that the State was
seeking a bright line that would permit law
enforcement officers to remove any passenger from
any vehicle, or to demand that any passenger
remain in any vehicle, all within the unfettered
discretion of the officer and not subject to judicial
review.
If such a rule were fashioned., a Supreme
Court Justice, as a passenger in a taxi, pulled over
for speeding in front of the Supreme Court, could
be required to remain in the cab for up to a half an
hour if the computer records indicated a problem
with the taxi driver. Moreover, because the State
had argued that many states had already applied
Mimms to passengers, our strategy included the
argument that there was no evidence that such a
rule had produced the desired goal of enhanced
officer safety.
After a few extensions courteously granted by
the Court, and after hundreds of hours invested on
our part, we filed the Respondent's Brief on
September 11, 1996. 11
The
point
headings
accompanying our arguments were as follows:
WHEN A POLICE OFFICER MAKES A LAWFUL
TRAFFIC STOP, THE AUTOMATIC RIGHT TO
REQUIRE THE DRIVER TO EXIT THE VEHICLE
CANNOT CONSTITUTIONALLY BE EXTENDED
TO PASSENGERS, WHEN THERE IS NO
REASONABLE
SUSPICION
THAT
THE
PASSENGER
HAS
COMMITTED
ANY
10

342 Md. 196,674 A.2d 928 (1996). The Supreme Court remanded
Dennis back to the. court of appeals, instructing it to reevaluate its
decision in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, the Court held that if the law
enforcement officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, the intrusion
was reasonable, regardless of the motives of the officer. On remand,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland reached the same result, although
the previous 7-0 became 6-1. Dennis v. State, 345 Md. 649, 693 A.2d
1150 (1997). The State again filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
which the Supreme Court denied. 118 S. Ct. 329 (1997).
To obtain a copy of the Respondent's Brief, call Ms. Barbara Jones
at 410-837-4635.

11
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WRONGDOING OR POSES ANY THREAT TO
OFFICER SAFETY, PARTICULARLY WHEN
SUCH A RULE WOULD INSULATE POLICE
CONDUCT -- AND MISCONDUCT -- FROM
JUDICIAL REVIEW.
A. Judge Moylan, a nationally recognized Fourth
Amendment scholar, correctly analyzed this Court's
decisions in Mimms, Rakas, and Long. He correctly
ruled that this Court has never permitted the police
to automatically require a passenger to exit a
vehicle, merely because the passenger is in a
vehicle that has been lawfully stopped for a traffic
violation.
B. It is unreasonable, under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, for the police to have the per se
power, as to all passengers, in all vehicles, under
all circumstances, to demand that the passenger
exit the vehicle, when there is no reasonable
suspicion of passenger wrongdoing and no threat to
officer safety, and the passenger is merely present
when the driver violates a traffic regulation.
C. If this Court were to extend Mimms to
passengers, much of the reasonableness analysis,
slowly and carefully evolved by this Court since
Terry, would be overruled.
D. No Fourth Amendment issue could be less
appropriate for the adoption of a bright-line rule
than the issue now before this Court. The State's
proposed rule would "draw the line" in such a way
as to extend unfettered discretion to the police, and
thus insulate police conduct from judicial review.
Moreover, by applying a bright-line rule in the
context of the most frequent of all citizen-police
encounters, this Court would be deeming an almost
limitless variety of situations to be constitutionally
indistinguishable.
E. Because Trooper Hughes was not
constitutionally entitled to automatically require
Wilson to exit the vehicle, the evidence seized was
a fruit of the poisonous tree. Accordingly, the trial
court correctly ruled that. the evidence must be
suppressed, and the appellate court correctly
affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
United States Attorney General
Janet Reno
During her first three and one-half years in
office, Attorney General Janet Reno had not argued
a case before the Court. In the summer of 1996,
with the presidential election ·only three months

away, there was speculation that, even if President
Clinton were re-elected, Ms. Reno may not be part
of the second-term Cabinet. Thus, it would not be
surprising if Attorney General Reno were seeking
an opportunity to argue before the Supreme Court.
Naturally, if the Attorney General of the United
States argues a case -- any case -- in the Supreme
Court, that fact alone will give the case a much
higher profile in the media than it otherwise would
have. Accordingly, it would be important to select
an "appropriate" case. Mary/and v. Wilson was the
perfect case for three reasons. First, by way of
background, Ms. Reno was a career prosecutor, so
the ideal case for her to argue would be a criminal
case. Second, because lay persons would pay
attention to the case as a result of the Attorney
General's participation, the ideal case would
present an issue with which the average man on
the street could identify. Virtually everyone is, at
some time, a passenger in a vehicle. Third,
because of the high profile of the case, it would be
important for the administration to select a case that
On August 15,
the government "could not lose."
1996, the United States, having previously filed an
amicus brief in Wi/son, filed a motion requesting ten
minutes of the thirty minutes of oral argument time
allocated to the State of Maryland. The State filed
an answer, in which it did not oppose the federal
government's motion, and the Court granted the
motion. 12 Thus, as I began to contemplate my
thirty-minute oral argument before the Supreme
Court, scheduled for December 11, 1996, I knew
that not only would I be arguing against the
Attorney General of Maryland, I would also be
arguing against the Attorney General of the United
States. For me personally, it was simply more good
luck. As the notoriety of the case increased, so did
the level of enthusiasm and encouragement from
both my students and my colleagues.
I was also very excited for my law school. I am
very loyal to my alma mater. Understandably, I felt
proud to be able to a part of the process that
brought national attention to the University of
Baltimore School of Law. The media was taking
note that an upcoming Supreme Court case would
be argued by the Attorney General of the United
States and two graduates of the University of
12117

s. CI. 34 (1996).
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Baltimore School of Law, one of whom was the
State Attorney General and one of whom was on its
faculty.
The Oral Argument
The Supreme Court has made an audiotape
of all oral arguments since 1955. The Earl Warren
Project has created a six-cassette tape series of
portions of the oral argument in eighteen landmark
Supreme Court cases. I listened to these tapes in
the morning while I jogged. To better prepare me,
Stacy McCormack created a chart of every case
(Supreme Court and otherwise) cited in any of the
briefs, to include the holding, the rationale, and the
facts. For Supreme Court cases, the chart included
the vote of every currently sitting justice, if
applicable, as well as whether that justice authored
or joined the opinion of the Court, a concurring
opinion, and/or a dissenting opinion.
During the two weeks before the oral
argument, I presented eleven practice arguments
before two-person or three-person panels. 13 I
requested each panel to be "hot," meaning a lot of
questions -- policy questions, questions relating to
the facts, holding, and rationale of prior deCisions,
questions relating to the record in this case,
questions on "what if' as to a myriad of scenarios
both normal and strange.
At exactly 10:00 a.m. on December 11, 1996,
Chief Justice Rehnquist called for oral argument in
the case of Mary/and v. Wilson, and· Maryland
Attorney General Joe Curran approached the
lectern. Joe had allocated fifteen minutes for his
argument, ten minutes for Ms. Reno's argument,
and five minutes for rebuttal. The bench was "very
hot," and the Court had all three of the advocates
"on the ropes" for the next sixty minutes. I argued
without notes. Not only did I know my argument, I
was sure that the Court would be so active in its
questioning that notes would be of no value. This
would be -- and in fact was -- a rigorous dialogue
and not a monologue. After the argument, when
reflecting on which justices had asked which
questions, I counted twenty-two questions that I
fielded during thirty minutes of argument.

13 I will always be grateful to those individuals who "mooted" me during
one or more of my eleven practice arguments. They included judges,
professors, attorneys, and former students.
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What I did not appreciate, until I stood at the
lectern, is that the advocate is only about ten feet
from the Chief Justice. Not only is the bench long,
with four justices spread out on either side, the
bench is bowed, such that Justice Ginsberg and
Justice Breyer, each of whom is on one of the
extreme ends as a junior justice, are about three
feet in front of the Chief Justice. To be able to see
all nine justices at one time, an advocate would
have to be about another ten feet further back.
Early in my argument, I had a trilogy of questions
from Justice Kennedy (two justices to my right),
Justice Breyer (four justices to my right), and
Justice Souter (three justices to my left), which
required me to keep turning from side to side. The
justices and I entered into a fast paced interchange
that continued, unabated, for thirty minutes.
I assumed that I would be nervous, but I was
not. I did my best to follow the advice of the late
Justice William Brennan, who suggested that
counsel come before the Court to explain their
doctoral thesis, and not come to fight with the
Court.
For twenty-one years, I have been
explaining principles of law, their rationale, and the
subtle nuances in their application. That is exactly
what I tried to do on December 11, 1996.
After the oral argument, Attorney General
Reno was gracious in her remarks to me and
generous with her time, as she joined Joe Curran
and me for pictures taken by the Law School
photographer. Her presence gave the case a high
profile, resulting in my participation in numerous
national television and radio forums, including CNN
"Crossfire," "Geraldo Rivera Live," "Cochran &
Company," and MSNBC.
Knowing the law, and understanding the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the current
Court, I had no illusion of prevailing on the merits of
the case. When the Court handed down its 7-2
opinion in favor of the State, on February 19, 1997,
I was not surprised. I did rationalize a pyrrhic
victory in two ways. First, Justice Kennedy, who is
usually pro-government on Fourth Amendment
search and seizure issues, wrote a dissent on the
defense side of the case. Second, the Court gave
the State less of a bright line rule than it requested.
Although the Court did extend to law enforcement
officers the per se authority to make all passengers
exit all vehicles, the Court declined to reach the
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issue of whether law enforcement officers have per
se authority to make all passengers remain in all
vehicles. Although the advocate in me fought hard
for a different result in Wilson, the citizen in me is
not uncomfortable with the law that resulted from
the Court's ruling.
Conclusion
I find now that whenever I sit as a visitor in the
Supreme Court, I relive those wonderful memories
of that one moment in time when the answers were
all up to me. Our system of government is founded
on the rule of law. Since Marbury v. Madison, 14 the
Supreme Court has been the ultimate authority
under our separation of powers doctrine. Decisions
such as Brown v. Board of Education, 15 Gideon v.
Wainwright,16 Roe v. Wade,17 United States v.
Nixon,18 Jones v. Clinton,19 and others prove the
point., To have been a small part of that legacy is
an awesome thought and an experience for which
I will always be grateful.

14

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

15

347 U.S. 483 (1954),

16

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

17

410

18

418 U.S. 683 (1974).

19

117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).

U.s. 113 (1973).
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